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An every man, not for every woman: Nigel Farage
and the radical right gender gap
Roosmarijn de Geus a* and Elizabeth Ralph-Morrow b
aNuffield College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK; bDepartment of Politics and International
Relations, University of Reading, Reading, UK
ABSTRACT
Support for the populist radical right (PRR) has surged across Europe. Existing
studies on female support for the PRR are mostly cross-national in nature and
have found that neither social-demographic nor attitudinal differences
satisfactorily explain the gender gap in PRR support. Here we focus on the
gender gap in support for UKIP and the Brexit Party, two parties that have
significantly shaped British politics. Using data covering two European
Parliamentary and three General Elections, we show that a gender gap exists
in PRR support, but that it varies over time. In line with comparative studies,
we find little evidence to suggest that social-demographic or attitudinal
differences explain the gender gap in PRR support. Instead, we show that
party leadership is crucial. Women in the British electorate hold negative
opinions on Nigel Farage and this explains the gender gap in PRR support in
Britain.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 31 October 2020; Accepted 23 May 2021
Introduction
Since the 1980s, researchers have revealed that more men than women
support the radical right (Spierings and Zaslove 2017). Although the existence
of the gender gap “is among the most consistent and universal findings”
about PRR parties (Harteveld and Ivarsflaten 2018, 369), scholars are unable
to agree on its cause. Demand-side explanations in particular, which maintain
that the gender gap is driven by men’s embrace of attitudes that align with
radical right support, have been upended by studies which show that women
hold anti-immigrant and authoritarian attitudes with a similar intensity to
men. Further, although the radical right gender gap has been documented
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throughout Europe, its presence (or absence) in Britain has largely evaded
scholarly attention. Therefore, the extent of Britain’s gender gap, and the
similarities and differences between men and women PRR supporters, are
unclear.
Our article breaks new ground by presenting the first comprehensive over-
view of the British radical right gender gap via a study of women’s support for
the United Kingdom’s two most electorally successful populist radical right
(PRR) parties: UKIP and the Brexit Party. Until now, scholars have typically
excluded Britain from studies of the radical right gender gap and failed to
consider the role of gender in UKIP and Brexit Party support (although see
Allen and Goodman 2021). This lacuna is significant in light of the role
that UKIP and the Brexit party have played in British politics – particularly
relating to the EU referendum outcome – and limits our understanding of
the women who support these populist radical right parties. Better insight
into the gendered nature of support for UKIP and the Brexit Party could
also provide a foundation for understanding men’s and women’s endorse-
ment, or rejection, of other PRR parties during a time of rising Euroscepticism.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss the populist and radical
right nature of UKIP and the Brexit Party, followed by an overview of the
leading explanations for the PRR gender gap. We then detail our data and
methods before turning to our analyses. Drawing on data from the online
British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) across five elections (Fieldhouse
et al. 2020), we find that the gender gap varies over time and that remarkable
similarities exist between men and women radical right voters when it comes
to their demographic profiles and political attitudes. Yet, we show that men
and women have significant and substantively different views of UKIP and
Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage, with women expressing more negative
views about him when compared to men. We show that these gender differ-
ences in support for Farage are an important explanation for the gender gap
in PRR support in Britain. A final section discusses the implications of our
research.
The British populist radical right
UKIP is Britain’s most significant PRR party; it has enjoyed unusual popularity
as a minor party in a first-past-the-post system, and its electoral growth
helped to precipitate the EU referendum (Carella and Ford 2020). Although
the Brexit Party has been unable to replicate UKIP’s General Election vote
tallies, the party was the runaway winner of the 2019 European Elections
during a time when the UK’s departure from the EU was the main issue
(Campbell and Shorrocks 2021).
The novelty of the Brexit Party means that few political scientists have had
the opportunity to research its voters. However, it is surprising that UKIP has
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been excluded from most cross-national analyses that focus on the PRR
gender gap. It is possible that UKIP’s status as a PRR party may not be at
the forefront of observers’ minds because of its origins as a single-issue,
anti-European Union pressure group (Ford and Goodwin 2014). It is also
plausible that UKIP’s reluctance to embrace “blood and soil” nationalism
(March 2017, 293) may lessen its radical appearance, while the notoriety of
the BNP’s violence and open racism may make it a more obvious contender
for any cross-national comparisons.
We follow Mudde (2007) in contending that an ideological core of nati-
vism, authoritarianism and populism defines the populist radical right. Nati-
vism refers to a belief that states should be exclusively inhabited by native
members, with non-native elements posing a threat. Authoritarianism
reflects a desire for a strictly ordered society where infringements of authority
are harshly punished. Mudde (2004, 2007) understands populism as an ideol-
ogy that considers society to be separated into two homogenous and com-
peting groups: the pure people and the corrupt elite.
Analysis of recent UKIP manifestos (March 2017) reveals that the party
embodies Mudde’s (2007) definition of PRR by displaying indicators of nati-
vism, authoritarianism and populism. Our examination of UKIP’s most
recent manifesto – “Policies for the People” (2019) – identifies similar traits
as the party accuses non-UK citizens of abusing the National Health
Service, calls for a reduction in early release prison sentences, and rejects
the House of Lords as “an affront to democracy”. The Brexit Party’s
“People’s Contract” (2019) contains indicators of populism and
nativism. The party demands “fundamental democratic reforms to fix our
broken political system and make Parliament serve the People”, and its call
for border protection was complemented by Farage’s campaign pledge to
cap immigration at a "sensible" 50,000 per year (BBC 2019-08-26). However,
the manifesto contains relatively little of the law-and-order rhetoric that
often characterizes authoritarianism, although it does demand an increase
in visible policing that would see officers focus on violent crimes, “rather
than enforcing restrictions on free speech”. We are therefore of the view
that while UKIP is clearly captured by Mudde’s (2007) definition of PRR, the
Brexit Party’s status is less clear-cut. March (2017) contends that classifying
a party as populist can be a question of degree (more-or-less) rather than
dichotomy (either-or); if we extend this approach when ascertaining
whether a party is populist radical right, then it is arguable that the Brexit
Party’s a PRR party, albeit to a lesser degree than UKIP.
Explanations for the populist radical right gender gap
Perhaps the most prominent explanation for the PRR gender gap contends
that gender differences within the labour market fuel the anti-immigrant
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attitudes that underpin PRR support. Here, it is argued that because men with
lower levels of education are overrepresented in blue-collar industries, they
may have to compete with immigrants for jobs in a globalized economy
and will therefore be attracted to the radical right’s xenophobic and protec-
tionist sentiments (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Betz 1994; Coffé 2018).
Although anti-immigrant attitudes are an important driver of radical right
voting (Clarke et al. 2016), the strength of this explanation for the gender
gap is undermined by existing studies which reveal that men do not necess-
arily hold more strongly anti-immigrant attitudes than women (Harteveld
et al. 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015a). Indeed, previous research
drawing on European Social Survey data suggests that within Britain,
women are more likely than men to be opposed to immigration (Ponce 2017).
Authoritarian beliefs are also an important attitudinal component of
radical right support (Donovan 2019), and some studies contend that
gender differences make men more likely than women to endorse authoritar-
ianism (Gilligan 1982). Campbell’s (2006) study of UK voters found that some
significant differences exist between men’s and women’s positions on the
liberal-authoritarian scale; however, other research suggests that gender
differences over authoritarian attitudes are overstated (Harteveld et al.
2015). Existing scholarship within the UK has found that voting to leave the
European Union – a key UKIP and Brexit Party issue – is strongly correlated
with Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Kaufmann 2016). However, this research
did not focus on the gender differences – if any – of these authoritarian
attitudes.
Voters who are discontented with the political system are more likely to
support populist parties, and for this reason, gender differences in democratic
satisfaction could be relevant to explaining the PRR gender gap (Givens 2004;
Harteveld et al. 2015). However, it is unclear whether and why women should
be more satisfied with democracy than men. Indeed, Harteveld et al.’s (2015)
study of the gender gap across 17 European countries found that women are
slightly less contended with democracy than men. Women’s greater demo-
cratic discontent could potentially be explained by their historical exclusion
from the political process or by the low levels of women’s descriptive rep-
resentation around the world (see Williams, Snipes, and Singh 2021). If
women are indeed more dissatisfied with democracy than men, then the
radical right gender gap is unlikely to be explained by this particular attitudi-
nal difference.
Finally, attitudes towards redistribution are also held to be relevant to the
gender gap; here, the argument goes that because women are more depen-
dent than men on the welfare state, PRR economic hostility towards public
services may render this party family unappealing to women (see Gidengil
et al. 2005). This argument has been challenged, though, by research
suggesting that PRR supporters generally do not have right-wing economic
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attitudes (Allen and Goodman 2021) and by research showing that PRR
parties are increasingly practising “welfare chauvinism” whereby support
for redistribution is predicated on the fact that welfare benefits should be
restricted to native citizens only (Harteveld et al. 2015). Certainly, in the
British case, there is evidence that UKIP practised welfare chauvinism by
seeking to restrict immigrant access to health and financial benefits while
increasing British national access to those same services (Ennser-Jedenastik
2018).
Scholars also examine sociodemographic characteristics, in addition to
attitudes, as a way to explain the radical right gender gap. Previous cross-
national studies of the European gender gap have found that manual
workers and individuals with lower levels of education – who tend to be
men – disproportionately support the PRR (Givens 2004; Immerzeel, Coffé,
and van der Lippe 2015). However, there is some evidence that the sociode-
mographic characteristics of British radical right supporters may be more het-
erogeneous than their European counterparts. Although early studies of UKIP
revealed that support was concentrated amongst the skilled working classes
(Ford and Goodwin 2014), more recent research (Evans and Mellon 2016)
shows that UKIP attracts a coalition of the working class and the “petty bour-
geoisie” – the self-employed and small employers. Indeed, numerically, most
of their supporters are drawn from the lower professional and managerial
occupations. If fewer British women are employed in working class or
lower professional/managerial occupations, then the potential pool of
UKIP/Brexit Party voters could be smaller amongst women than men.
Women’s greater religiosity is another demographic characteristic that is
potentially relevant to the gender gap; here, is argued that because churches
throughout Europe condemn radical right anti-immigrant rhetoric, church-
goers are unlikely to support this party family (Mayer 2015; Betz 1994).
However, it is unclear whether religiosity is likely to influence the British
radical right gender gap. Tilley (2015) observes that religious cleavages in
the UK are associated with party affiliations but also notes that because the
number of people who actively practise their religion over time has fallen,
religiosity is unlikely to be a highly salient element of political behaviour.
So far, our discussion has focused on potential gender differences in the
demand-side factors of PRR support. However, supply-side factors are also
important (see Mudde 2007); here, the role of party leadership may be par-
ticularly relevant to the PRR gender gap. Vote choice scholarship has shown
the significance of party leaders in general (Bittner 2011), and various
additional studies have suggested that the party leader is especially impor-
tant in understanding support for PRR parties (Coffé and van den Berg
2017; Evans, de Geus, and Green n.d.). This may be because PRR parties
are often centred around a leadership figure and tend to lack more formal-
ized structures. However, other research has found that party leader effects
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are similar for mainstream and PRR parties (van der Brug and Mughan
2007).
With respect to party leadership and the gender gap, Mayer (2015) has
found that in the 2012 French presidential election – and unlike her father
before her – Marine Le Pen was equally supported by male and female
voters. Mayer (2015) observes that feelings of warmth towards Marine Le
Pen were instrumental in closing the PRR gender gap, and, second only to
Euroscepticism, were the best predictor of National Front voting. The role
of leadership in the PRR gender gap is also examined in Allen and Goodman’s
(2021) cross-national study; here, the authors speculate that female leaders
could reduce the radical right gender gap by (1) lessening the stigma associ-
ated with their party family if they are perceived as less extreme than their
male counterparts (see also Harteveld et al. 2015; Ben-Shirit et al. 2021)
and (2) providing women voters with descriptive representation. Somewhat
surprisingly, Allen and Goodman (2021) found that female leadership nega-
tively predicted PRR support, although the authors acknowledge that
because their study only included four parties led by women, this finding
should be probed further.
This previous scholarship, then, suggests that party leadership may
affect the PRR gender gap. However, because this research largely
focuses on female leaders, the role played by male leaders in creating
the gender gap is obscured. This is a significant omission; PRR parties
(as well as mainstream parties) are overwhelmingly led by men, and
strongman populism is on the rise throughout Western Europe and
beyond (see Smith 2021). Importantly, Harteveld et al. (2015) and Spierings
and Zaslove (2015b) speculate that the political style, and masculine lea-
dership and rhetoric, that characterizes the PRR may deter women voters
from supporting this party family. Turning to the British case, there is a
strong argument that Nigel Farage promoted masculinity within both
UKIP and the Brexit Party. The public persona of Farage is that of an Every-
man: a straight-talker who shuns political correctness and is rarely photo-
graphed without his “pints-and-fags” (Starck 2020, 43). Farage as UKIP
leader promoted toxically masculine practices within the organization
(Daddow and Hertner 2019, 4–5): he made comments which denigrated
women, admitted that the party looked “blokeish”, and engaged in stereo-
typically masculine behaviours such as beer-drinking, gambling and
smoking. Throughout 2019 – the year of the Brexit Party’s participation
in the European and General Elections – Farage’s masculine leadership
and rhetoric continued; he bemoaned his exclusion from a pub crawl orga-
nized by Wetherspoons chairman Tim Martin, and used his platform within
the European Parliament to urge fellow MEPs to “[s]trike a blow for your
citizens” by voting against the candidacy of Ursula von der Leyen
(Higgins 2020; European Parliament 2019).
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The populist radical right gender gap, then, is typically explained with
reference to attitudinal or sociodemographic differences, although some
scholars (Allen and Goodman 2021; Mayer 2015; Spierings and Zaslove
2015b) have suggested that a focus on PRR leadership could also shed
light on this puzzle. With this in mind, we now turn to an empirical test of
these various explanations for female support of the British populist radical
right throughout recent elections.
Data
We use the combined wave 1–19 of the British Election Study Internet Panel
(Fieldhouse et al. 2020) for our analysis. This data consists of 19 waves and
covers 3 general elections (2015, 2017 and 2019) and 2 European elections
(2014 and 2019). BESIP consists of an online sample of YouGov panel
members that completed repeated questionnaires over time. Our analysis
focuses on support for UKIP and the Brexit Party as British populist radical
right parties. We exclude the British National Party (BNP) due to its small
number of supporters during this time and because the party, with its
history of physical confrontations, is likely to be classified as extreme -
rather than populist radical - right (Goodwin 2011).
The gender gap in populist radical right support
We find evidence of gender gaps in PRR support in all elections under study
(Table 1). The support base for UKIP and the Brexit Party is always predomi-
nantely male, and the percentage of the male electorate that voted for these
parties is always greater than the percentage of the female electorate that did
so. The gender gap in PRR support is significant in all elections under study.
There is over-time variation, with some indication that the gender gap has
decreased, given that the largest gap was in 2014 (6%). This may reflect
the fact that the positions held by UKIP and the Brexit Party – especially






















2014 EU 57/43 31% 10,390 25% 9883 6%***
2015 GE 57/43 15% 11,144 11% 11,426 4%***
2017 GE 57/43 2.2% 11,761 1.6% 12,179 0.6%***
2019 EU 55/45 39% 12,179 34% 11,293 5%***
2019 GE 59/41 3% 12,618 2% 12,743 1%***
Male/Female ratio is the percentage of UKIP/BXP supporters that are male or female. The gender gap is
the difference in the percentage of Male and Female electorate that voted for the PRR. All gender gaps
are significant at *** p < 0.001 based on OLS regression models (Table A4 online supplement).
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about the EU – have become increasingly mainstream, especially in the wake
of the referendum. However, the second-largest gender gap was found in the
2019 European Elections (5%);this suggests that the gender gap is dependent
on the overall levels of support for the party and we see larger gender gaps
when the parties received their highest levels of support.
Explaining the populist radical right gender gap in the UK:
demographic features and attitudinal differences
After having established a gender gap in support for the British PRR, we
examine potential reasons for it. Existing studies have focused on two key
explanations. First, they have suggested that differences in men’s and
women’s demographic profiles, specifically types of occupation and levels
of education and religiosity, may explain the lower levels of support
among women (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Betz 1994; Coffé 2018).
Second, they have suggested that men and women may hold different pol-
itical attitudes.
To understand the potential role of demographics, we took a descriptive
look at demographic differences between the male and female electorate
in Britain, and PRR supporters in particular (details in online supplementary
materials Tables A1 and A2). In line with comparative literature, we find
that men and women differ on certain demographics that are associated
with PRR support. Women are more religious than men, and men and
women work in different occupation sectors. Specifically, women are more
likely to work in “intermediate” jobs (jobs that combine service and labour),
but are less likely to work in “routine” jobs than men. Although it is thus poss-
ible that the under-representation of women especially in “lower supervisory
and technical” and “routine” jobs may explain their under-representation
among radical right supporters, we find that the occupational composition
of PRR supporters mostly mirrors that of the general population, suggesting
that demographic difference might not hold much explanatory power. We do
not find any clear differences in the proportion of men and women with a uni-
versity degree. We conduct a formal test to see whether different demo-
graphics are predictive for a vote for UKIP or the Brexit Party for men and
women and do not find this to be the case (supplementary materials,
Table A5).1
A second explanation for the PRR gender gap is differential attitudes.
Several key attitudes have been linked to support for the radical right, includ-
ing nativism – which consists of anti-immigrant and nationalist views –
1The exception is 2014 and occupation where we find that occupation type was a significant predictor for
women, but not for men – although small employeeship was significant also for men. We don’t find
statistically significant gender differences in the predictive power of occupation type in the other
elections.
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authoritarianism, and, to a lesser extent, attitudes toward economic redistri-
bution and democratic dissatisfaction (Harteveld et al. 2015; Immerzeel,
Coffé, and van der Lippe 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015a; 2017; Givens
2004). In the context of Britain, attitudes toward the EU have also been
shown to be crucial in explaining PRR support (Evans, de Geus, and Green
n.d.). We first explored whether men and women in Britain hold distinctly
different attitudes that may explain differential levels of support for the PRR.
We provide this information in Table A6 of the supplementary materials.
This analysis suggests that there are significant differences – on average –
in key attitudes across men and women in the British electorate. However, it is
not the case that British women consistently hold attitudes that would make
them less predisposed toward voting for the PRR. Women display higher
levels of Englishness than men at every point in time and are more likely
to hold the view that immigrants are detrimental to the British economy.
Women are also more authoritarian in their views than men, although this
difference is partially driven by the fact that women are significantly more
authoritarian on a particular item of the authoritarian scale – censorship.
When this item is removed differences are not always significant and other-
wise substantively small. Either way, women are not significantly less author-
itarian when compared to men.
On other attitudes, women seem less supportive of the radical right
worldview. With the exception of 2015, women are more satisfied with
democracy than male respondents and women are more in favour of redistri-
bution.2 When we look at EU attitudes and the cultural dimension of immigra-
tion an interesting pattern can be observed. Prior to the EU referendum (June
2016), the average female respondent was more negative about the EU com-
pared to the average male respondent and was also more likely to state that
immigrants undermine British culture. Yet, post-referendum, men become
more opposed to the EU and more anti-immigrant on the cultural dimension.
This could suggest that the EU referendum had a stronger effect on activating
these attitudes in men, or that the EU referendum and its accompanying cam-
paign had a negative effect on women’s support for these attitudes. That
control formed a key part of the Brexit campaign – as evidenced by its
slogan “Take Back Control” –may be relevant here, with gender studies litera-
ture indicating that exerting and resisting control are key features of mascu-
linity (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009).3
2Although as discussed – this may or may not predispose them toward the PRR depending on whether
PRR parties adopt welfare chauvinistic standpoints.
3Table A7 in the online supplement replicates the main analysis but accounts for Don’t Know responses
by setting these to the mid-points of the scale. This does not substantively alter the results, the excep-
tion is EU-attitudes where we find no significant gender difference prior to the referendum when using
this approach.
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It is also possible that certain attitudes associated with PRR support may
exert different influences on men’s and women’s respective vote
choices. Women may be more nationalist than men, but if nationalism is
not important to women’s vote choice then this does little to explain
women’s PRR support or the gender gap. This is referred to by Harteveld
et al. (2015) as a potential moderation effect of gender. We test this
through conducting regression analysis of PRR vote choice based on attitudes
and demographics. We find no evidence of moderation; there are no gender
differences in the types of attitudes that matter in predicting a vote for UKIP
or the Brexit party. For both men and women, EU and immigration attitudes
are key predictors of PRR support. We provide these results in the online sup-
plementary materials (Table A8).
Explaining the gender gap: leadership
We nowmove to an analysis of Nigel Farage and his role in explaining gender
differences in support for UKIP and the Brexit Party. We present the mean
level of Farage’s likeability for men and women in the general electorate
and for those who voted for UKIP and the Brexit Party in Figure 1. We also
include likeability scores for Paul Nuttall, who was UKIP’s leader in the 2017
General Election. Leader likeability is measured on a 0–10 scale with respon-
dents being asked how much they like/dislike a given party leader.
Figure 1. Support for Nigel Farage and Paul Nuttall. Data are weighted, non-voters and
don’t know responses excluded. Leader likeability from pre-election waves. Bars rep-
resent 95% Confidence Intervals. Supporters are those that voted for UKIP/Brexit
Party in the given election.
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It is evident that Farage ismore liked amongmen than amongwomen.Differ-
ences in Farage’s average likeability between men and women are statistically
significant in all elections for both the general electorate and UKIP and Brexit
Party supporters (Tables A9 and A10 of online supplement). Further, the differ-
ences are substantive, ranging between 0.56 and –0.67 on a 0–10 scale in the
general electorate and between 0.2 and 1.10 among UKIP and Brexit Party sup-
porters. By contrast, likeability scores of Paul Nuttall do not differ significantly
betweenmen andwomen in the general electorate, although they do differ sig-
nificantly among party supporters, with women liking Nuttall less. We do note
that Paul Nuttall was largely unfamiliar to people, with almost 30% of our
sample giving a “Don’t Know” response to his likeability.
In line with existing research, we find that women were much more likely to
answer “Don’t Know” when asked how much they like/dislike Nigel Farage and
Paul Nuttall (Table A11). On the one hand, this may indicate that women do like
Nigel Farage, but because they experience higher levels of social desirability
pressure and consider Nigel Farage a controversial figure, they answer “Don’t
Know” instead. The other option is thatwomendonot have a clearly formulated
opinion of Nigel Farage, either because they perceive his appeal to be mainly
targeted tomen or because his leadership is less important to their vote choice
To get some traction on how gender differences in Don’t Know responses
affect our findings, we also looked at gender differences in the likeability
ratings for other party leaders in this period (Table A12 online supplement). We
find that female “Don’t Know” responses outnumber male “Don’t Know”
responses in all cases. Further, the percentage of women that answered “Don’t
Know” when asked about Nigel Farage is similar to that for Theresa May and
Jeremy Corbyn, thereby suggesting that this is not a pattern that is specific to
Nigel Farage, but rather reflective of gender differences in survey responding.
To assess the robustness of our findings we rerun our analyses presented
above and replace a “Don’t Know” response for both men and women with
the average male or average female response.4 Using this approach we
find the same substantive results. From this we conclude that women in
Britain are significantly less positive about Nigel Farage than men,
thereby reducing his appeal among the female voter pool.
Gender gap in populist radical right support: assessing the
explanations
After having discussed three potential explanations for the gender gap in
radical right support in isolation (demographics; attitudes; Nigel Farage),
4Note we opt for this rather than setting the response to the mid-point of the scale (5) since the mean
response for men and women in the electorate is below 5. Choosing the theoretical midpoint would
strongly inflate Farage’s scores among both men and women. Results in Tables A13 and A14 of the
online supplement.
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we now look at these explanations alongside each other. To assess the expla-
natory value of social-structural, attitudinal and leadership likeability, we take
a stepwise regression approach. In the first model, we simply present the
gender gap size; in the second model we include demographic variables
(age, work status, education level, religiosity and occupation type); in the
third set of models, we add attitudes (redistribution, immigration, EU atti-
tudes, authoritarianism, nationalism and democratic dissatisfaction); and in
the final model, we add likeability ratings of Nigel Farage and, in the case
of the 2017 General Election, Paul Nuttall. To compare regression coefficients
across models, we run OLS regression models with robust standard errors.
Given that our dependent variables are binary (voted for UKIP or Brexit
Party or not), these are linear probability models. We present the same
models in the online supplement using logistic regressions and find the
same substantive results (Tables A18 and A19).
Vote choice is measured in the post-election waves. Demographics are
also taken from the post-election waves, but missing data on these variables
are filled in with pre-election wave data to maintain a larger portion of the
sample for the regression analyses. Attitudes are measured in the pre-election
waves, with the exceptions of attitudes in the 2019 European elections
model, which are taken from the post-election wave to maintain a larger
sample size and to better reflect the gender gap as found in Table 1.5 The
exception to this is leadership ratings for which we use pre-election values
to avoid endogeneity concerns. In the case of the 2017 elections, we
present a model with Farage and a model with Nuttall.
What we expect to see is a gender gap in the first models (in line with the
gender gap in Table 1). Then, if either of the explanations underlies the
gender gap, we expect this gender gap to be reduced in the subsequent
models. Looking at Table 2, we see that there is a statistically significant
gender gap in support for UKIP and the Brexit Party in all elections. The
gender gap does not disappear – and occasionally increases – when demo-
graphics and political attitudes are added to the model, thereby suggesting
that these do not explain the source of the gender gap.
However, when the likeability of Nigel Farage is added to the models, the
gender gap reduces in size and ceases to be significant. The 2017 General
Election further offers an interesting case where we can look both at the
effect of including attitudes toward Farage and to the effect of including atti-
tudes toward the then UKIP leader Paul Nuttall. Here we see that adding
5For the 2019 EU model, the pre-elections wave model has N = 7647 compared to N = 9460. Further-
more, the “raw” gender gap in the 2019 European elections was approx. 5% and statistically significant
(Table 1), which is better reflected when using the larger sample used here (gap = 3% and significant)
versus the smaller sample (2% and not significant). Table A17 provides models using pre-election atti-
tudes, and this specification supports the results presented here: the gender gap increases and is sig-
nificant when demographics and attitudes are included, but is insignificant once attitudes toward
Farage are accounted for.
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Farage likeability does render the gender gap insignificant, but including
Nuttall does not; this suggests that the gender gap is really a Farage effect.
The importance of Nigel Farage in gathering votes for UKIP and the Brexit
Party should not be under-estimated. For instance, using the full regression
models including demographics and attitudes, we find that moving from
the lowest to the highest like-score for Farage increased the likelihood of
voting for the Brexit Party in the 2019 European elections from 0.23 to
0.72. To give an example of how the different levels of Farage likeability
matter, we find that in the 2019 EU elections, a voter who held the average
male likeability score of Nigel Farage had a predicted likelihood of voting
for the Brexit Party in this election of 0.40, whereas a voter who held the
average female position on Nigel Farage had a likelihood of voting for the
Brexit Party of 0.37, holding all other attitudes at their mean value.
Discussion and conclusion
We find that the support base of UKIP and the Brexit Party in five recent elec-
tions was predominantly male. In testing explanations for the gender gap in
PRR support in Britain, we find little evidence for social-demographic or attitu-
dinal differences. Rather, we find that Nigel Farage’s leadership of both these
parties is a key explanatory factor for the gender gap in PRR support in
Britain. Farage was an important draw to both UKIP and Brexit Party voters
across all elections included in our study. And yet, across all elections, we
find that women are much less supportive of Farage compared to men. We
have an interesting comparison case with Paul Nuttall as UKIP’s leader in
2017. We find that among the general electorate there were no gender differ-
ences in his likeability, suggesting that Farage was particularly unappealing to
the female electorate. The fact that the success of UKIP and the Brexit Party have
been so strongly linked to Farage suggests a conflict: in the absence of Farage,
the party appears to struggle to attract general levels of support, but his pres-
ence prevents the party from drawing in a larger segment of the female elec-
torate. To further understand this trade-off requires a better understanding of
the extent to which the performance of masculine leadership is a particular
draw (deterrent) to male (female) PRR supporters in Britain and elsewhere.
Farage’s masculine leadership style may be off-putting to women voters, who
are in turn deterred from supporting his parties. In addition to his “man at the
pub” political identity, the pro-Brexit rhetoric of Farage’s two parties at times
slid into “a nationalism infused with ideas of restored empire and repossession”
(Piatto 2018, 122). Given the close connection between manhood and nation-
hood (Nagel 1998), Farage’s rhetoric is unlikely to resonate with women
voters. Future scholarship could further interrogate the role of Farage’s mascu-
linity in UKIP/Brexit Party support by asking voters which gendered traits they
associate with Farage (for example, decisiveness and aggression, or warmth
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and compassion) and whether they view those traits favourably or unfavourably.
That some women who are not strongly supportive of Farage still vote for him is
a finding that is likely to interest scholars of vote choice more broadly; because
voters tend to have very high favourability ratings of the leaders of the parties
they support (Coffé and van den Berg 2017), women’s simultaneous lower levels
of enthusiasm of Farage and endorsement of his party are something of an aber-
ration. Future researchers could conduct qualitative interviews with women
UKIP/Brexit Party voters who dislike Farage to probe this anomaly.
Unfortunately, our research has been unable to empirically test every
explanation for the gender gap. We note two in particular. First, we have
not considered here whether increasing equality between men and women
fuels the gender gap. Norris and Inglehart (2019) point to changes such as
the replacement of traditional patriarchal values with norms favouring
gender equality. White men without a college degree may be particularly
resentful of these changes and embrace the socially conservative and author-
itarian values that often align with PRR support. Second, because our data
lacks the relevant measures, we have not considered whether British
women are more motivated than men to control prejudice, and therefore
less likely to support the radical right (see Harteveld and Ivarsflaten 2018).
Our researchhas alsobeenunable to take intoaccount theheterogeneity and
intersectionality of women’s identities (Annesley, Gains and Sanders, 2021).
Instead, we present research that focuses on women as a homogenous group,
defined and differentiated by their gender. Theremight bemuchmore substan-
tive gender gaps in PRR support between men and women within certain seg-
ments of the population (e.g. young men and young women) (see Shorrocks
2016), but gaps in PRR support might also be substantial across various
groups of women (e.g. white vs. non-white; or educated vs. non educated
women). Understanding within-gender gaps and the importance of intersec-
tional identities and PRR support is thus a crucial avenue for future research.
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